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I. Introduction 
Over the last few years, many of the heavily indebted countries have also experienced 
heavy capital outflow or capital flights. Capital flight has become an important topic for 
detailed study in particular countries that are heavily-indebted. This interest arises, 
amongst other reasons, because of the role that external assets stored away in foreign 
lands can play if left in the domestic economy, and the dwindling resources from inter-
national creditors in recent times. 
It is widely believed that the study of capital flight or highly indebted countries 
is important because of the economic problems such flights can create (see Khan, 1989). 
The outflow of capital can cause a shortage of liquidity in the economy and lead to the 
exertion of upward pressure on the interest rate. Similarly, the shortage of liquidity can 
cause a depreciation of the domestic currency if the authorities are operating a floating 
exchange rate system. If the government is defending a particular exchange rate, a loss 
of reserves will ensue. 
When resources are being lost in the form of capital flight, there are several 
long-term effects. The first is that the availability of resources for domestic investment 
is reduced. The rate of capital formation is reduced by capital flight and this adversely 
affects the country's current and future prospects. Income that is generated abroad as 
well as wealth held abroad are outside the purview of relevant authorities and cannot be 
taxed. The resulting effects are a reduction in government revenue and its debt servicing 
capacity. Capital flight can exacerbate a balance of payments crisis if, at the time, capi-
tal outflows are taking place. Capital flight can also compound the foreign finance prob-
lems of heavily indebted countries if creditors are reluctant to give further assistance as 
a result of capital outflows. 
The link between capital flight and growth is expressed vividly in the literature. 
Two of the most recent and relevant are Deppler and Williamson (1987) and Lessard and 
Williamson (1987). The linkage is expressed as follows by Deppler and Williamson 
(1987, p. 52): "the fundamental economic concern about capital flight, however, is that 
it reduces welfare in the sense that it leads to a net loss in the total real resources avail-
able to an economy for investment and growth. That is capital flight is viewed as a 
diversion of domestic savings away from financing domestic real investment and in 
favour of foreign financial investment. As a result, the pace of growth and development 
of the economy is retarded from what it otherwise would have been". 
The linkage is also expressed by Lessard and Williamson (1987) in the same 
vein: 
The best case involves a reduction in the savings to finance domestic invest-
ment of a magnitude essentially equal to the size of the capital flight. Future 
growth will in consequence be lower. The worst case involves a reduction 
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not just in future growth possibilities but also in the current level of output 
by some multiple of the size of capital flights" . (p. 224). 
A brief critique of the views expressed is given later. 
Many reasons are often adduced for capital flight. The preponderant of the causes 
are economic. The economic aspect are inextricably interwoven with political causes, 
and favourable foreign economic incentives. The domestic macroeconomic policy dis-
tortions are mainly economic. These distortions manifest themselves in large public-
sector deficits, exchange rate misalignment and financial repression. Apart from these, 
there are also the incentives provided by foreign banks and governments. Part of the 
explanation for capital flight is also political. This is predicated on corruption and ac-
cess to foreign funds by political leaders. It has been alleged that some political leaders, 
through the perquisites of their offices, siphon funds to foreign countries. 2 
Nigeria is one of the heavily-indebted countries where the issue of capital flight 
has been regarded as important. There is, however, no comprehensive study on the causes, 
measurement, magnitude and consequences of capital flight with particular reference to 
Nigeria. 3 Given the magnitude of Nigeria's external debt and the possible impact of 
capital flight on the country's real debt service capacity, a study of capital flight and 
external debt is essential. 
This study concentrates on capital flight and external debt in Nigeria. 4 The study 
will focus on the definition, magnitude, determinants, mechanisms and consequences of 
capital flight. The analysis will also explore the possible measureable assets in which 
the money is held once it arrives abroad. Emphasis will be on the macroeconomic ef-
fects of capital flight within the context of economic, socio-economic and other func-
tions. 
Specifically, the study will 
• Examine the size and magnitude of capital flight for the period 1970-88. Differ 
ent alternative methods of measurement will be examined; 
• Analyze the economic (mainly macroeconomic) and other factors responsible 
for capital flight; 
• Examine conduits through which capital flight takes place; 
• Identify the major consequences of capital flight on the domestic economy; 
• Examine the linkages between capital flight and external debt and draw policy 
conclusions. 
II. The definition of capital flight 
This section surveys and analyses the various definitions and measures of capital flight 
in the existing literature. The approach adopted is two-fold. First, is a discussion at the 
conceptual level, the rationale or the basis for classifying domestic outflows as capital 
flight instead of normal flows. The second approach is strictly empirical. The objective 
is to compute and analyze the alternative measures (estimates) of capital flight. The 
measurements are derived from a common data base for the period 1970-88 to show the 
variation in the estimates brought about by alternative definitions. 
The use of the term capital flight arouses strong emotions. Some analysts view 
it as a symptom of a sick society. Some observers see capital flight as the cause of the 
heavily indebted countries' inability to recover from their debt problems. Capital flight 
is regarded by others as a pejorative description of natural, economically rational re-
sponses to the portfolio choices that have confronted wealthy residents of some debtor 
countries in recent years (Lessard and Williamson, 1987 p. 201). The controversy sur-
rounding the term is due partly to the absence of a precise and universally accepted 
definition for it and partly because of the way the term is used between developed and 
developing countries. It is usual among some economists to refer to capital outflows 
from developed countries as foreign investment while the same activity when under-
taken by the residents of a developing country is referred to as capital flight. 
One of the reasons for this dichotomy is the belief that investors from the devel-
oped economies are responding to better opportunities abroad. These investors, on the 
other hand, are said to be escaping the high risks which they perceive at home. This 
interpretation makes it obvious why a lot of economists are ill-at-ease with this defini-
tion of capital flight. In general, it is believed that the investors from all countries, 
whether developed or developing, will base their decisions on the relative returns and 
risks of investments at home and abroad. 
A distinction is often made also between legal and illegal transactions to distin-
guish between capital flight and so-called normal capital. Since illegal transactions are 
not reported to the compilers of the balance of payments statistics, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which they therefore constitute capital flight. Capital flight is capital that 
flees (Walter, 1986, Kindleberger, 1987). Alternatively, capital outflows in response to 
economic or political crises are capital flight (Husted and Melvin, 1990). Normal capital 
flows on the other hand, refer to flows that correspond to ordinary portfolio diversifica-
tion of domestic residents. 
According to Cuddington (1986, p. 2), capital flight refers to short-term capital 
outflows. It involves hot money that responds to political or financial crises, heavier 
taxes, a prospective tightening of capital controls or a major devaluation of the domestic 
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currency or actual or incipient hyperinflation. An expensive definition of capital flight is 
adopted by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986, p. 13). Capital flight is defined as 
the reported and unreported acquisition of foreign assets by the non-bank private sector 
and elements of the public sector. 
To classify our thoughts on capital flows, Table 1 presents a taxonomy of fac-
tors explaining international capital flows utilized by Lessard and Williamson (1987). 
The upper left quadrant of the table identifies various factors based on differences in 
economic returns across countries. In the upper right quadrant are those additional fac-
tors that deal with two-way flows - normal portfolio diversification. Most theoretical 
and empirical studies of capital flight have placed emphasis on the lower left and right 
quadrants. The factors emphasized are those that create a wedge between economic and 
financial returns regardless of whether they operate across the board or asymmetrically 
among residents or non-residents (Lessard and Williamson, 1987 p. 217). 
From Table 1 it can be seen that, normal capital outflows are the ones that take 
place to maximize economic returns and opportunities between countries. Normal port-
folio diversification takes place on the basis of differentials in economic returns. Capital 
flight, on the other hand, as seen from this analysis is that subset of capital outflows thai 
are propelled by source country policies (Lessard and Williamson, 1987, p. 217). 
Table 1: Taxonomy of factors explaining international capital flows 
Economic risks 
and returns 
Financial risks 
and returns 
One-way flows 
Natural resources endowments 
Terms of trade 
Technological changes 
Demographic shifts 
General economic managements 
Taxes (deviations from world 
levels) 
Inflation 
Default on government obligations 
Devaluation 
Financial repression 
Taxes on financial intermediation 
Two-way flows 
Differences in absolute riskiness of economies 
Low correlation of risky outcome across country 
Differences in investor risk preferences 
Differences in taxes and their incidence between 
residents and non-residents 
Differences in nature and incidence of country 
Asymmetric application of guarantees 
Different interest ceilings for residents and 
non-resident 
Different access to foreign exchange 
denomination claims 
Political instability, potential confiscation 
Source: Lessard and Williamson, 1978, p. 216 
III. A review of the measures and estimates 
of capital flight 
A number of capital flight estimates have been made over the last several years. The 
preponderant of these studies cover a number of countries including Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Venezuela. A recent study by Rojas-
Suarez (1991) covers Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Gabon, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Venezuela and the former Yugoslavia. These 
studies differ from one another in terms of methodology, country coverage, data sources 
and time span. The most significant of the studies on capital flight which have made 
impact include the studies by Dooley (1986), Dooley et. al. (1986), World Bank (1985), 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986), Cuddington (1986), Cumby and Levich (i 987), 
Gulati (1985), Lessard and Williamson (1985), Khan and ul Haque (1985), Gajdec/.ka 
(1990) and, Khan (1989). 
In the World Bank (1985) study, capital flight is defined as the sum of gross 
capital outflows and the current account deficit less increases in official foreign reserves. 
Cuddington (1986) takes a different approach. Capital flight is defined as shorl-lerm 
speculative outflows which, according to him, is the typical meaning of capital flight. Il 
is therefore defined as short-term external assets by the non-bank private sector plus the 
errors and omissions in the balance of payments. Cuddington's (1986) approach is con-
centrated on "hot money funds" because of the fact that these funds respond quickly to 
changes in expected returns or to changes in risk. Variations in economic conditions are 
likely to affect the flow of these funds. These are the funds that are expected to return 
very quickly to the country when economic conditions improve. 
Khan and ul Haque (1985) calculated capital flight for eight highly indebted 
developing countries for the period 1974-82. Capital flight is defined in two ways. 
First, it is defined simply as gross private short-term capital flows plus net errors and 
omissions in the country's balance of payments accounts. This is the same as (lie 
Cuddington estimate. The second method tries to take account of normal capital flows. 
Capital flight is defined as that part of the increase in external claims that yields no 
recorded investment income (see Dooley, 1986). 
The Dooley (1986) study does tease out the normality of capital flows by specifi-
cally separating out normal and abnormal capital flows. The Dooley method seeks to 
measure the stock of privately-held foreign assets that do not generate income that is 
reported to the domestic authorities. The identified capital outflows in the balance ol 
payments accounts are cumulated, and three adjustments are then made to capture the 
unreported capital flows. First, errors and omissions are added. Second, a comparison is 
made between the stock of external debt as reported in the World Bank data and those 
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reported in the balance of payments statistics. The difference between the two is added 
lo the estimate of the increase in private sector foreign assets. The third adjustment 
involves the calculation of the stock of external assets needed to give the investment 
income in the balance of payments by using international market rates, for example, the 
United States treasury bill rate. 
In the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986, p. 13) study, capital flight is 
defined as the reported and unreported acquisition of foreign assets by the non-bank 
private sector and some elements of the public sector. Capital flight is therefore net 
investment inflow plus changes in gross external debt plus current account balance and 
change in selected gross foreign assets. Cline (1986) critiques the capital flight defini-
tion adopted by Morgan Trusty Company (1986). He argues that income from tourism 
and border transactions should be subtracted since these earnings are beyond the control 
of the relevant foreign exchange authorities. He also argues that reinvested investment 
income should not be considered as capital flight since this also is beyond the control of 
the authorities. 
In what is referred to as the "mirror stock statistics", capital flight is measured as 
the recorded Cross Border bank deposits of non-banks by residence of depositor. These 
figures can be found in the statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. 
Apart from utilizing these various measures, it is also possible to take cogni-
zance of trade faking. Trade faking is the misinvoicing of exports and imports in inter-
national trade. The derived results from trade faking can be added to any of the mea-
sures to derive another set of data on capital flight. 
A schematic summary of the different definitions (or type of measure), the 
methodology and the authors are summarized for easy reference in table 2. It should be 
emphasized that the different methods will yield different results not only because the 
definitions are different but also because of differences in data sources. The results may 
therefore be conflicting, and comparisons are difficult to make. 5 
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Table 2: Alternative measures of capital flight 
Definition Methodology Authors 
Narrow measure net short term capital outflow plus 
errors and omissions. Cuddington 
Derived measure* part of increase in external claims 
that yield no recorded investment 
income. Dooley 
Residual measure 
or Sources and uses 
approach 
Change in debt plus net foreign and 
direct investment minus current 
account deficit plus change in reserves 
Chang & Cumby 
World Bank Pastor 
Private Claims 
measure 
acquisition of external claims by the 
private sector including deposit banks 
and the non-bank sector plus recorded 
errors and omission in the balance of 
payments. 
Cornesa 
Mirror stock 
statistics method 
Cross Border bank deposit by 
residence of depositor 
Khan & ul 
Haque 
Change in private 
foreign assets+ 
the counterpart of the sum of 
net direct investment inflows, 
change in gross external debt, 
current account balance and change 
in selected gross foreign assets. 
Morgan 
Guaranty 
Coy. 
Notes: + this measure is also often seen as another aspect of the residual measure. 
* this can also be called stock of unreported foreign assets measure. 
IV. Alternative measures of capital flight for 
Nigeria 
We present in this section alternative measures of capital flight for Nigeria. There are a 
number of objectives behind the calculation. The primary objective which is modest is 
to show the range of capital flight implied by the alternative definitions of capital flight 
that are offered. The additional objective is to examine the extent to which capital flight 
is continuous or episodic. In other words, it is the objective of the calculation to show 
whether heavy outflows tend to concentrate in certain years, and small flows in others. 
That finding in itself may suggest that capital flights are associated with particular eco-
nomic/political events. In the realm of economic/political events, this may be associated 
with poor macroeconomic management, inflow of large foreign exchange from export 
(export boom), and civilian/military governance etc. 
As mentioned earlier, there is no precise and universally acceptable way of mea-
suring capital flight. What is required is some judgement taking due cognizance of the 
objectives for measuring capital flight and the economic/social environment of the country 
for which capital flight is being measured. In measuring capital flight for Nigeria, a 
number of approaches are taken in this study. The first approach recognizes that capital 
flight is speculative capital. It is hot money fund on the wing. It is one that is expected 
to respond to the various forms of distortion mentioned earlier. Taking this approach of 
course means that capital flight refers essentially to capital export by the private nonbank 
sector, although in some cases banks and official entities may also engage in it 
(Cuddington, 1986, p.2). Since capital flight is essentially concealed, they show up in 
the error and omissions of the balance of payments entry. Thus, capital flight is defined 
as the sum of short-term private capital flows plus errors and omissions in the balance of 
payments statistics. The results of the calculations are shown in Table 3. 
As can be seen, some of the figures are negative. The intuitive explanation is that 
the negative signs cannot connote capital flight. As explained in the Cuddington study 
(1986, p. 5) the figures reflect capital flight net of unrecorded capital inflow. 
Essentially however, the years with negative signs are better perceived as years 
of capital repatriation or capital inflow. Thus in the period 1972-89, the total capital 
inflow was US $7,573 million. Out of this total sum, US $7,362 million (97%) came in 
between 1972-78, the period usually associated with Nigeria's period of oil wealth. During 
the political era, that is the period in which civilian government was in power, the capital 
inflow was US $270 million. Thus, using this technique of calculation, one can see the 
episodic nature of capital flight. As a result of the buoyant economy associated with the 
oil boom years, the macroeconomic environment can be said to be favourable to capital 
inflows. 
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Table 3: Capital flight, 1970-89 (US$ million) 
1970 134.0 
1971 205.0 
1972 119.0 
1973 -177.0 
1974 48.0 
1975 -42.0 
1976 5.0 
1977 -231.0 
1978 43.0 
1979 211.0 
1980 -673.0 
1981 106.0 
1982 149.0 
1983 -63.0 
1984 -642.0 
1985 -2014.0 
1986 -249.0 
1987 -953.0 
1988 -1315.0 
1989 -1895.0 
Cumulative Total: 
1972-78 -7362.0 
1972-89 -7573.0 
1979-83 -270.0 
Sources: Data used in calculation from IMF (1990) IFS Statistics Yearbook. 
Using approaches by Cumby and Levich (1987), Varman (1989) and Varman-Schneider 
(1991), we calculate from balance of payments statistics a number of capital flight esti-
mates for Nigeria using various methods shown in Table 4. The data is drawn mainly 
from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook, the IMF Balance of Payments Sta-
tistics Yearbook and the World Bank Debt Tables. The result of the calculation is shown 
in Table 5. This is the first time that this is done for Nigeria. There has been no similar 
calculation elsewhere using the different definitions shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4a: Notations 
11 
A. Current account balance 
B. Net foreign direct investment 
C. Private short term capital outflows 
D. Portfolio investment 
E. Banking system foreign assets 
F. Changes in reserves 
G. Errors of omissions 
H. Changes in debt 
I. IMF credit 
J. Travel credit 
K. Reinvested FDI income 
L. Other investment income 
M. Counterpart items 
Table 4b: Capital flight estimates 
World Bank = (H + B + A + F) 
Erbe = (H + B + A + F) 
Morgan = (H + B + A + E + F) 
Cline = (H + B + A + E) - (J + K + L) 
Duwendag = (H + B + A + F + G + l + M) 
Source: Lessard and Williamson, 1987, p. 38. 
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Table 5: Capital flight: different estimation methods (US$ million) 1971-1989 
ERBE & MORGAN 
YEAR WORLD BANK TRUSTY CLINE DUWENDAG 
1972 106.40 477.28 453.37 127.70 
1973 636.10 1,265.38 1,228.03 551.75 
1974 325.00 5,995.00 5,824.27 450.88 
1975 119.80 5,988.60 5,474.48 148.04 
1976 124.80 5,524.44 5,044.21 187.40 
1977 2,490.00 7,021.86 6,554.79 2,111.95 
1978 508.40 2,695.20 2,309.48 235.23 
1979 -86.30 5,659.54 5,370.07 601.59 
1980 2,713.30 12,974.11 12,234.36 2,590.79 
1981 2,132.30 6,145.22 5,267.31 1,345.14 
1982 -3,805.80 -2,230.87 -2,230.87 -3,812.09 
1983 2,016.10 3,098.82 2,893.61 1,991.64 
1984 -169.80 1,594.72 1,494.72 182.81 
1985 3,569.40 5,385.40 5,272.14 2,994.58 
1986 5,502.90 6,841.80 6,592.39 5,138.37 
1987 5,874.60 7,522.20 7,398.83 5,462.11 
1988 1,043.80 2,479.12 2,385.12 902.80 
1989 -299.70 2,212.46 2,102.46 -369.70 
Cumulative Totals 
1972-79 4,224.2 34,627.3 32,258.7 4,414.5 
1972-89 22,801.3 30,650.3 75,330.3 20,841.0 
1979-83 2,969.6 25,646.8 23,196.0 2,717.7 
Source: Calculated using formula in Table 2. 
The differences in the magnitudes of the results using various definitions of capital flight 
are not suiprising given the differences in definition. The similarities and differences 
can be classified according to different periods. In 1970-73 for example, the World Bank 
(1985) and Erbe (1985) estimates were generally lower than the other three estimates. 
The amplitude of capital flight for the period 1985-87 were, however, not too different in 
the four measures. What is important is the cumulative sums of capital flight for given 
specific years. 
Of the four approaches, the Duwendag (1987) approach consistently gave the 
lowest estimate in all cases. A line graph of the approaches reveals that the Erbe World 
Bank and Duwendag approaches are close as shown by the variations of these figures 
just as the Morgan Trusty and Cline are also very close in terms of the amplitude of the 
figures. 
It is clear that the different results obtained derive from the different materials 
that go into the calculation of capital flight. It is also clear that the approaches yield a 
significant amounts of capital flight over the period covered. 
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND EXTERNAL DEBT IN NIGERIA 1 3 
In the period 1972-89, the amount of capital flight varied from US $20,841 
million in the Duwendag method to a high amount of US $80,650 million. It is not 
surprising that the Morgan Trusty and Duwendag measures are exceedingly high be-
cause of the variables involved in the measurement. Given the relative importance of 
capital in capital-scarce economies like Nigeria, the most relevant definition of capital 
flight which unitizes the "sources and uses" approach is more appropriate. This is be-
cause it implicitly assumes that any outflow is abnormal because of the scarcity value of 
capital in developing countries. Concentrating on the World Bank definition therefore 
implies that between the period 1972-79, the total amount of capital flight in Nigeria was 
US $22,801 million. This figure would be utilized later for the purposes of comparison 
with the increases in external debt. 
Using the World Bank approach as the most appropriate in this case, the years 
1979, 1982, 1984 and 1989 were years of capital inflow. As to whether capital flight is 
episodic, it can be seen that during the period 1972-78, the cumulative capital flight was 
US $4,310. This was a period of military regime, and a period that coincided essentially 
with the peak in Nigeria's oil wealth syndrome. The total amount of capital flight during 
the civilian regime (1979-83) was US $2,970 million, that is 69% of the military regime! 
11 is difficult, however, to come to any conclusion as to whether capital flight actually 
occurred more under a military regime than a civilian regime because the economic 
fortunes of Nigeria were not the same in the two periods. 
The third approach used is what was referred to earlier as the mirror stock statis-
tics method. This method draws on international banking statistics to evaluate the amount 
of assets held abroad by the residents of developing countries. This method of estimating 
capital flight has been used by Khan and ul Haque (1987). It is particularly useful, as we 
shall see, in determining the minimum level of assets held abroad. For this method, the 
recorded statistics by the IMF are the Cross Border Bank deposits of nonbanks by resi-
dence of depositors which for Nigeria is shown in Table 6. The statistics for Nigeria 
started in 1981. 
The estimate of capital flight using the Cross Border Bank Deposit of Non-banks 
by Residence of Depositors is shown in Table 7. This amount shown in table 6 repre-
sents stocks per year. When capital flight is defined as the increase over the previous 
year, we find that the amount is relatively very small. In all cases, the amount represents 
the lowest of all the estimates. 
1 4 RESEARCH PAPER 3 5 
Table 6: Cross border bank deposits on nonbanks by residence of depositor: Nigeria 
$ million 
1981 1,540 
1982 1,380 
1983 1,380 
1984 1,170 
1985 1,500 
1986 1,680 
1987 2,300 
1988 1,960 
1989 2,790 
Cumulative Totals: 
1981-89 15,700 
Sources: IMF Yearbook, 1989,1990 
Table 7: Nigeria: Cross border deposit of nonbanks by residence of depositor, 1981-1982 
Year Amount of Change in Cross Cross border Cross border 
deposit border deposit deposit/external deposit/GNP 
(US$ million) (US$ million) debt 
1981 1540 0.128 .016 
1982 1380 150 0.108 .015 
1983 1380 0.0 0.075 .016 
1984 1170 -210 0.063 .013 
1985 1500 230 0.078 .017 
1986 1680 180 0.073 .037 
1987 2300 620 0.077 .096 
1988 1960 -350 0.063 .068 
1989 2790 840 0.085 .101 
Cumulative Totals: 
1981-89 15,700 1460 
Source: IFS Year Book 1989, IMF, Washington, DC 
IFS Year Book 1990, IMF, Washington, DC 
World Bank, World Debt Tables 1989-1990 
There are a number of explanations why this cannot be an adequate measure of capital 
flight. First, some funds are held in deposits outside the major financial centres. Indeed, 
the nationality of the depositor in some foreign banks is never revealed. The most often 
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cited example is that of Swiss bank accounts where secret codes are maintained to con-
ceal not only the identity of the depositor, but also their nationality. Second, substantial 
amounts which are not revealed are held in assets other than bank deposits. Some such 
assets are held in other financial assets: equities, bonds, treasury bills, etc. and physical 
assets. As a result of the above, the figures underestimate capital flight. 
In a large sense, however, these amounts are indicative of the money which 
could have been utilized domestically. Such deposits are better seen within the context 
of other macroeconomic variables such as external debt and GNP shown in Table 7. We 
find that the Cross Border Deposit/External Debt Ratio varied from 6.3% to 12.8%. The 
Cross Border Deposit as a ratio of GNP varied from 1.3% to about 10% for the period 
shown. 
V. Causes of capital flight 
The causes of capital flight as discussed in the literature are many. The various factors 
can be grouped under relative risks, exchange rate misalignment, financial sector con-
straints, fiscal deficits and external incentives (Khan, 1989) and disbursement of new 
loans to LDCs (Cuddington, 1987). These are, no doubt, economic factors. There are, 
however, other non-economic factors which, though important, are often ignored. These 
include corruption of political leaders and extraordinary access to government funds. 
These factors are now discussed. 
In a decision-making process on investment, the wealth holder looks at the vari-
ous risks. There are certain inherent characteristics of developing countries which make 
risks attached to investments larger than those of developed countries. Using the con-
cept of expropriation risk within the context of an intertemporal optimizing model, Khan 
and ul Haque (1985) show that any increase in risk in a rational expectations setting 
would tend to increase the outflow of private capital from the domestic economy into 
foreign countries where investments are less risky. This expropriation risk could include 
a variety of distortions such as differences in taxes and political instability resulting in 
possible destruction of private property. Eaton (1987) builds on the Khan-Haque model 
by relating the risk of expropriation of capital owned domestically, which is defined, 
especially in this case, as higher taxation to public and publicly guaranteed foreign debt. 
The tax obligation arising from an increase in external debt can lead to capital flight. 
The flight of one investor leads to a rise in the potential tax obligations of other remain-
ing investors. This also may create the incentive for other investors to move their assets 
abroad. 
It is generally agreed that one of the principal determinants of capital flight is 
exchange rate misalignment. It has been amply demonstrated in the empirical analysis of 
several studies (Dornbusch, 1985, Cuddington, 1966, Lessard and Williamson, 1987, 
Pastor, 1989 and Pastor, 1990 that the real exchange rate plays a significant role in the 
direction and magnitude of capital flight from highly-indebted countries. Under normal 
circumstances, if a currency depreciation is expected, domestic wealth owners would 
shift out of domestic assets into foreign assets. In general, it is difficult to measure 
precisely exchange rate expectations. It is safe, however, to assume that if a currency is 
overvalued, economic agents would expect the currency to be devalued in the future. 
Holding firm to this expectation would cause residents to avoid the potential capital loss 
by converting into foreign claims. 
Financial sector constraints can lead to capital flight. It is well known that nar-
rowness of the capital and money markets is a feature of developing economies. These 
markets therefore provide only a limited variety of financial instruments in which wealth 
can be held. There is also in many developing countries the lack of full or credible 
deposit insurance on assets that are held in the domestic banking sector. As a result of 
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these constraints, residence of developing countries look abroad to invest their wealth. 
Additionally, there are extensive controls on interest rates and other aspects of 
financial market behaviour in developing countries. Government policies in the finan-
cial sector have resulted in nominal interest rates that are far below the rates on compa-
rable foreign financial instruments. In such situations, it is expected that investors will 
seek alternative assets that will yield not only positive but higher returns. 
It has been shown by Dornbush (1985) that capital flight is typically accompa-
nied by fiscal deficit. When a rising fiscal deficit is financed through the printing of 
money, it leads to inflationary pressure. To avoid the erosion of their monetary balances 
by inflation, moving out of domestic assets is one way of avoiding inflation tax. When 
fiscal deficit is financed through bond sales, domestic residents may expect that at some 
future date their tax liabilities may increase to pay for the national debt. This would 
encourage domestic investors to move their assets to foreign countries to avoid potential 
tax liabilities. 
Ize and Ortiz (1987) formalized the link between deficit financing and capital 
flight. In the Ize-Ortiz model, capital flight is related to the overall financial solvency of 
government. Insolvency and default risks created by fiscal deficit appear explicitly as 
the determinants of capital flight. 
A number of external factors influence the flight of capital, generally in terms of 
the opportunities available outside the country, including attractiveness of interest rates, 
and the range of financial instruments in which wealth can be held. This is aptly put by 
Walter (1986, p. 120): 'flight implies havens, and havens take the form of national status 
that provide an attractive range of real and financial assets to foreign based investors, 
political and economic stability, a favourable tax climate for non-residents and various 
other attributes that generally are the obverse of conditions triggering capital flight in the 
first place. On some types of deposits, withholding taxes are not taken from non-resi-
dent deposits. Certain countries allow secret accounts which are attractive to some wealth 
owners and can facilitate illegal transactions and tax evasion. 
As a result of the principle of national sovereignty, it is difficult for foreigners to 
have inside information on asset holdings abroad. One safeguard is the domestic bank 
secrecy law which bars both the national and foreign authorities alike. The other is the 
blocking statute which effectively prevents the disclosure, copying, inspection or re-
moval of documents located in the host country unless there is an order from or by 
foreign authorities (Newcomb and Kohler, 1983). 
Some authors argue that capital inflow in the form of disbursements to develop-
ing countries are a major cause of capital flight. In the case of public sector borrowing, 
the availability of foreign exchange increases the potential for graft and corruption. It is, 
therefore, logical to assert that for many developing countries, (Nigeria inclusive), abuse 
of official power can lead to capital flight. There are anecdotal evidences that highly 
placed public officials using the paraphernalia of their office siphon some of the money 
under their care to foreign countries solely for their own private use. 
In Nigeria's case, it is difficult to rank the various causes of capital flight in any 
order of importance. It is important, however, to point out that a poor macroeconomic 
policy stance has resulted in all kinds of distortions. At the same time, the role played by 
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other factors such as access to foreign exchange through various perquisites of offices 
and consequent possible abuse cannot be underestimated. 
VI. The mechanisms of capital flight 
There are many ways in which capital flight can occur. The conduits are many and it is 
almost impossible to develop an exhaustive inventory of channels. This section dis-
cusses the most significant channels for Nigeria. 
First, transfers can take place through cash or monetary instruments. These are 
usually in the form of either foreign or domestic currency, travellers cheques or other 
cheques. In the early 1970s, stories abounded about Nigerian currency being carried out 
of the country and exchanged in big financial centres like London and New York to be 
exchanged legally for other currencies at current market rates. Inspite of the present 
economic predicament, there are still some African countries where the naira is exchanged 
for other currencies in the course of trade. 
Second, capital flight can take place through bank transfers from a local affiliate 
of a foreign institution to a designated recipient abroad. This is possible at the market 
rate where no constraints or restrictions are in place. Transfers can still be possible in the 
face of exchange controls but possibly at a less favourable rate. The history of the 
development of banking institutions in Nigeria shows the existence of local affiliates of 
foreign banks. That transfers of the type mentioned have been taking place in Nigeria 
cannot be in doubt. It is reasonable to claim, however, that such transfers may not be 
available for incomes that are illegally generated. 
Another method of transfer is through precious metals and collectibles, includ-
ing works of art. Local currency is converted into gold, silver or other precious metals, 
precious stones, jewellery and similar assets that cannot only be abroad but that will also 
be able to retain their value. The sale value of these are usually high in foreign currency. 
Usually, governments tend to restrict or prohibit imports and exports of any such items. 
Such international transfers therefore usually involve smuggling, with its inherent risks. 
The fourth mechanism of transfer is through false invoicing of trade transac-
tions, where export ad import invoices are either issued that are either different from 
agreed prices or faked. Estimates of this type of transfer are known to have been under-
taken by Bhagwati (1974), Naya and Morgan (1974) as well as Bhagwati, Krueger and 
Welbulswasdi (1974). Recent analysis by Gulati (1987) shows that there can be system-
atic over-invoicing and under-invoicing of exports or imports. The expectation in the 
case of capital flight is that exporters will systematically engage in under-invoicing while 
importers over-invoice and in the process derive foreign exchange that is outside the 
control of the foreign exchange authority. The procedure for doing this is that the for-
eign supplier issues an invoice that is gu nan the agreed price of the product. The 
importer on receipt of the necessary fo u exchange remits it to the foreign supplier 
who then keeps the difference in a bank for the use of the importer. On the export side, 
the invoice issued is for an amount in foreign currency that is less than the agreed price. 
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The foreign buyer places the difference between the invoice price and the agreed price in 
a foreign bank account of the exporter and remits the invoice amount. It is this amount 
of money that is surrendered to the Central Bank for local currency at the prevailing 
official exchange rate. To measure the magnitude of invoice faking, partner country 
analysis is generally undertaken. 5 
Capital flight through false trade invoicing is generally applicable to the local 
affiliates of multinational companies, and owners of business engaged in international 
trade. It is known in some cases that false invoicing can be multiplied through a practice 
called round tripping. The process is one in which foreign currency assets are accumu-
lated abroad at the official exchange rate via trade misinvoicing (via over - or under-
invoicing). Some of the assets are repatriated in the form of cash or other monetary 
instruments which are converted to local currency at a premium in the local parallel 
market. Whatever gain is made in local currency can then form the basis for further 
false-invoiced transactions. This in effect is arbitrating the official and parallel-market 
exchange rates (Walter, 1986, p. 113). 
A fifth method of transferring money abroad is through the black market, until 
recently a thriving source of transferring funds abroad. The amount of money trans-
ferred this way is difficult to estimate. 
A sixth vehicle through which capital can be transferred overseas is through 
commissions and agents' fees, which are paid by foreign contractors into the foreign 
bank accounts of residents. 
VII. The link between capital flight and 
external debt 
Several authors have pointed out the seriousness of capital flight for debt accumulation 
in LDCs. Indeed, some studies have shown that the ease with which capital flight takes 
place is related to the availability of foreign exchange. It is more appropriate, however, 
to examine the macroeconomic relationship between external debt and capital flight. 
Within this context, the discussion can be along two lines. The first analyzes 
strictly the relationship in terms of causality between external debt and capital flight, 
while the second considers issues related to the various macroeconomic issues with re-
gards to external indebtedness and capital flight. Beginning with the first, we can ana-
lyze the relationship between external debt and capital flight. From the literature, there 
are two kinds of linkages between external debt to capital flight. The first linkage runs 
from external debt to capital flight while the second runs from capital flight to external 
debt. Each of the two groups can be subdivided into two. Thus, the direct linkage can be 
divided into four major groups on the basis of whether the direction of causality runs 
from debt to capital flight or vice versa or whether one simply provides the motive for 
the other or whether it provides the means as well. 
Debt-driven Capital Flight. If consequent to external borrowing, residents of a 
country are motivated to move their assets to foreign countries, we have debt-driven 
capital flight. Capital flees or leaves the country in response to attendant economic 
circumstances directly attributable to external debt itself. The attendant economic cir-
cumstances leading to debt-driven capital flight are expectations of exchange rate de-
valuation, or fiscal crisis, possibility of a crowding out domestic capital and avoidance 
of taxes and ex-propriation risk. 
Debt-fuelled Capital Flight: In this case, the inflow of capital provides both the 
motive and the resources for capital flight. In the case of debt-fuelled capital flight, 
borrowed funds are themselves transferred abroad. There are two processes through 
which money can be transferred. First, government can borrow money and this is sold to 
domestic residents who transfer these money abroad through legal or illegal means. In 
this case, government is the provider of foreign exchange. Second, government on-
lends funds to private borrowers through a national bank. The borrowers in turn transfer 
part or all the capital abroad. In this case, the external borrowing provides the necessary 
fuel (the resources) for capital flight. 
We can now turn to the causation in the other direction. There is on the one hand 
a case which is purely motivational, while on the other hand, we have a case where 
capital flight provides the resources which re-enters the country. These are referred to as 
"flight-driven external borrowing" and "flight fuelled external borrowing", respectively. 
Flight-driven External Borrowing: This situation develops when as a result of 
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capital that has left the country there is a gap which needs to be filled in the domestic 
economy. Consequently, there is a demand for replacement on the part of both the gov-
ernment and the private sector. The reasons why external creditors are willing to meet 
this demand is attributable to different risks and returns facing resident and non-resident 
capital. 
Flight fuelled External Borrowing: In this situation, a domestic currency leaves 
the country but re-enters in the guise of a foreign currency. What happens is the "flight 
capitalist seeks to arbitrage the yield and risk differentials between resident and external 
capital, by engaging in a series of transactions sometimes known as "round tripping" or 
"back to back loans". Resident capital is dollarised and deposited in an overseas bank, 
and the depositor then takes a "loan" from the same bank (for which the deposit may 
serve as collateral)". 
The second set of arguments in this connection state that when capital flees a 
country, that amount of money is lost to the potential investment in productive domestic 
activity. This would have earned foreign exchange, if such investments were made in the 
tradeable sector of the economy. One general popular argument calls for either an incen-
tive to return funds held abroad by domestic residents or a significant reduction in the 
outflow of such funds. Accordingly, the heavily indebted countries would be in a better 
position for at least two reasons. The first is that the funds so returned can be used to 
boost domestic investments and thereby enhance debt servicing capacity. Thus, the is-
sue of capital flight is germane to the issue of real debt servicing capacity. This is very 
important in the case of Nigeria because of the high debt service ratio. 
Second, a heavily indebted country that restricts capital flight would be in a 
better position to adjust to any subsequent fall in external funding. These two arguments 
are no doubt over-statements of the issues involved in capital flight. The impression is 
given that economic opportunities are equal between countries (which is not the case) 
and that the adoption of appropriate macroeconomic policies can release more funds 
domestically for investment purposes. Most of the arguments in the area are being in-
creasingly linked to the issues of stabilization and growth (see for example, Dornbusch, 
1990). What is often ignored in the argument, however, is that it is possible for resources 
to be returned to the domestic economy in the form of financial holdings (fixed deposits 
etc.), and not in machines and equipment for production or investment in the tradable 
sector. 
There are other linkages between capital flight and external debt. One of the 
most popular hypothesis is the debt overhand argument which states that large external 
debt discourages domestic investment. This is based on the fear that the tax liability of 
domestic investors will rise in the future. 
Another relationship is that of internal transfer, where resources are transferred 
from the private to the public sector to finance government expenditure. As foreign debt 
increases, the internal transfer problem will also increase in magnitude, fostering capital 
flight. 
A large external debt is a source of instability for no other reason than the fact 
that the outcome of the debtor creditor position is hard to predict. As the fiscal burden of 
high external debt increases, a potentially unhealthy struggle for scarce resources within 
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the economy is put in motion. 
A better understanding of the relationship between capital flight and external 
debt can be gained by looking at some important statistics (see Table 8). Utilizing the 
capital flight derived earlier, the cumulative sum for the period 1972-89 is US$2280.1. 
The cumulative sum of the change in debt for the same period is US$32181. Thus, the 
ratio of capital flight to changes in external debt is about 71 % for the entire period. On 
a year by year analysis, some selected periods have been chosen. For the years 1977, 
1980, 1985 and 1986, capital outflows exceeded foreign debt accumulation indicating 
the depletion of domestic resources. 
It is significant to note that when the capital flight/ change in external debt was 
as high as 352% in 1985, the year preceding the adoption of the structural adjustment 
programme in Nigeria, the investment/GDP ratio was 7.5%. 
Important insights can be gained by looking at the statistics of changes in exter-
nal debt and those of investment and growth. In periods of high growth rate in external 
indebtedness as in the periods 1977-81, the gross investment as a percentage of GNP 
was at its highest range of 20 - 27% for the entire period. Thus, increases in debt accu-
mulation had effects on investment. But the effect it could have had on growth in GDP 
was counteracted by capital flight. When the capital flight/change in debt ratio was 
69%, 36%, 352% and 122.5%, growth rates were negative 6%, 4%, 4% and 48%, re-
spectively. 
These findings will seem to lend credence to the general belief that capital flight 
has deterrent effects on the growth of the economy. The validity of such a statement and 
its definitiveness can only be based on rigorous empirical analysis, which is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
2 4 RESEARCH PAPER 3 5 
Table 8: Nigeria: external debt, capital (light, growth in GNP and some ratios (US$ million) 
External Capital Change Capital Growth Gross Capital 
Debt Flight In Flight In Invest- Flight 
External External GNP ment A Debt 
Debt Debt of GDP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1972 732 106.4 81 14.5 15.0 18.3 
1973 1,205 636.1 473 52.8 12.2 19.4 
1974 1,274 325.0 69 25.5 74.1 14.6 
1975 1,143 119.8 -131 10.5 20.8 21.8 
1976 906 124.8 -237 13.8 22.8 27.1 
1977 3,146 2,490 2,240 79.1 13.7 26.7 111.2 
1978 5,091 508.4 1,945 10.0 9.2 24.8 
1979 6,235 -86.3 1,144 -1.4 25.5 20.1 26.1 
1980 8,934 2,713.3 2,699 30.4 29.0 20.5 100.5 
1981 12,018 2,132.3 3,084 17.7 -5.6 21.4 69.2 
1982 12,954 -3,805.8 936 29.4 -2.4 15.4 
1983 18,539 2,016.1 5,585 10.9 -3.5 11.4 36.1 
1984 18,537 -169.8 -2.0 0.09 3.5 6.4 
1985 19,551 3,569.4 1,014 18.3 -3.7 7.5 352.0 
1986 24,043 5,502.9 4,492 22.9 -48.2 9.7 122.5 
1987 31,193 5,814.6 7,150 18.8 -49.2 11.4 82.2 
1988 31,947 1,043.8 754 3.2 20.7 12.3 
1989 32,832 -299.7 885 0.9 -1.2 12.5 
Cummulative Total 
1972-89 32,801.3 32,181 
Ratio of Capital Flight to Change in External Debt (%) = 70.9 
Sources:IMF: IFS Yearbook, IMF Washington, D.C.; Debt Tables; 
World Bank, World Development Report, 1990, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
VIII. Conclusions 
This paper has addressed general issues at capital flight. Specifically, we have tried to 
estimate the magnitude of capital flight using different alternative methods. We have 
also discussed the causes, the mechanisms of capital flight and the link between capital 
flight and external debt, among others. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. The first is that there is no generally 
accepted definition of capital flight. Given the institutional framework and the nature of 
the economy, we have been able to adopt a definition and a measure of capital flight. 
Second, a significant proportion of total capital flight is recorded in the balance of pay-
ments and debt statistics. The implication of that, however, is that the adequacy of the 
measure is dependent on the accuracy of the items in the balance of payments statistics, 
and debt data. To the extent that these statistics are not accurate, their usefulness is in 
doubt. 
Other important vehicles of capital flight, for example, are left out of the present 
estimates. Such vehicles include smuggling currency movements and invoice faking. 
There are possible indicators that a lot of money is transferred through trade invoice 
faking. In general, since trade faking add to capital flight, the underinvoicing of exports 
and over-invoicing of imports, the two should be added for the net effect of trade faking 
on capital flight. To the extent that underinvoicing and overinvoicing exist in Nigeria, 
the capital flight is underestimated. Third, if a large amount of wealth resides abroad, 
tax revenues are adversely affected and policy variables cease to be representative of the 
real situation. 
Fourth, even though domestic policy distortions can lead to capital flight, the 
role of access to political offices and perquisites of the office cannot be ignored. Indeed, 
many people who have transferred money abroad and belong to this category do so not 
in the course of business but as a result of access to foreign exchange. The extent to 
which the provision of domestic incentives and the elimination of policy distortions will 
bring a reversal of capital flows is not precisely known. What is certain, however, is that 
political and macroeconomic stability play big roles in the flow of capital. A suitable 
and stable macroeconomic environment that eliminate domestic macroeconomic policy 
errors will ensure that the economic functions which bring about capital flight are elimi-
nated. Of significance in the area of policy errors that propel capital flight are inflation, 
exchange rate misalignment, fiscal deficit, financial repression. The issue of corruption 
is more difficult for prescriptive purposes. The only safe thing that can be said is that 
there is need for attitudinal changes which require serious commitment to honest gov-
ernment on the part of political office holders. Nigeria has a domiciliary account where 
foreign currencies can be kept. It is possible that the availability of this avenue may be 
important in possible repatriation of some foreign funds. Its usefulness in attracting large 
sums of money to the country under the present system is, however, limited. 
Notes 
1. The revision of this paper came about four years after the original paper was pre-
sented. It has therefore benefitted from my subsequent thought and writings on 
the same issue. No attempt has, however, been made to enlarge the scope and 
coverage of the original paper despite suggestions to that effect by one anony-
mous reviewer. I thank the anonymous referees for their comments and sugges-
tions which I found useful. One of the reviewers asked that I ensure that this piece 
be up to the 'high quality standard' of my World Bank Research Paper Series. I 
hope I have put in what is necessary in this paper to meet the standard. The usual 
caveat applies: I am solely responsible for any "errors and omissions"! 
2. For the developing countries, examples often cited included the late Marcos of the 
Philippines and the leaders of Haiti and Zaire. In Nigeria, some powerful political 
members who fled the country after the military coup of 1983 are alleged to be-
long to the Marcos group. 
3. The available studies that make reference to Nigeria are limited. The comprehen-
sive study of Rojas-Suarez (1991) lumped Nigeria in the group of heavily in-
debted countries. The study did not estimate capital flight for each country. 
4. A recent survey of the various methods undertaken by Deppler and Williamson 
(1987) lists only four of the methods discussed here. 
5. While we recognize the capital flight that can arise from invoice faking, this is the 
topic of a future study. 
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